We consider Nash equilibria in 
, the payoff to Bob and simultaneously, given , the payoff to Alice. On the one hand, it is easy to check that a given pair of mixed strategies forms an equilibrium. On the other hand, the best algorithms for finding a Nash equilibrium of an arbitrary £ -player game have exponential complexity. Moreover, there is some evidence that finding an equilibrium is unlikely to be NP-hard [26, 27] . Determining the complexity of finding equilibria has lead to much research in a variety of directions, e.g., a quasi-polynomial-time algorithm to find an approximate Nash equilibrium due to Lipton et al. [22] ; an investigation into the complexity of finding pure strategy Nash equilibria in succinctly specified games by Fabrikant et al. [14] ; a polynomial-time algorithm of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden for finding Nash equilibria in multi-player symmetric game in which each player has a small number of strategies [30] ; a proof that the LemkeHowson algorithm takes exponential time with all possible initial pivots [32] .
In this paper, we consider £ -player games where the two payoff matrices are chosen randomly. Our motivation is the question of whether finding Nash equilibria is any easier in random games compared to general games, that is, easier "on average". In a random game, every entry in each of the matrices is drawn independently according to some probability distribution. We consider the uniform distribution on an interval and the standard Normal distribution . In the first case, the distribution of any set of x entries of a payoff matrix is uniform in a x -dimensional cube, while in the second case it is a x -dimensional Normal. In fact, there has been much work in this direction for a special case of £ -player games, the zero-sum case. This case is equivalent to linear programming. Motivated by the question of explaining the success of the simplex algorithm, Borgwardt [7] , Smale [34] and Megiddo [25] studied linear programs where the constraints are chosen randomly from spherically symmetric distributions and showed that variants of the simplex algorithm run in polynomial time. Besides simplex, other simple methods (e.g., the perceptron algorithm) also work for random linear programs, demonstrating that they have considerably more structure than arbitrary linear programs.
Here we show random games are indeed much simpler than general games. Specifically, we show that with high probability, there is a Nash equilibria in which the supports of the mixed strategies of both players have small cardinality. We remark that in a random game the supports of each player will have the same cardinality in a Nash equilibrium. As a result, the following naive heuristic is a Las Vegas algorithm for finding Nash equilibria: exhaustively check for Nash equilibria with supports of cardinality`5
until an equilibrium is found. In fact, with high probability only two phases will be required!
The key to our result is a reformulation of the problem in terms of random polytopes. For convenience, we will assume that
. We will see in Section 2 that, given a mixed strategy for Alice (Bob), the supports of a best response strategy for Bob (Alice) are precisely those supports that induce facets with non-negative normal vectors in an associated random polytope. Consequently, the algorithmic problem of finding Nash equilibria can be tackled by considering problems relating to the number of points on the convex hull of a set of § random points in ¡ dimensions. In Section 3 we extend analysis of such random polytopes for our purpose. This allows us to examine the quality of our algorithm in Section 4. In particular, consider the convex hull of ? The probability that one subset @ induces a facet is wellunderstood for many important distributions, including the Gaussian and the cube. We prove the following refinements (that may be of independent interest). are subsets of
Lemma 3. Suppose
is a face of
The proof of these lemmas for the Normal distribution can be carried out directly using the density function. We give such a proof of Lemma 3 at the end of this section (the proof of Lemma 4 is similar). For a cube, however, things are more complicated and we will use an economic capcovering [6] . The next theorem is implied by the results of [4] . . This is only the covering near a single vertex, the origin, of the unit cube, which is extended to a complete covering using the symmetries of the cube in the obvious way. One can define cap coverings for other distributions as well, replacing the volume of each set @ c by its measure. Such a covering exists for the Normal distribution if the complement of a suitably large ball is deleted.
We will use cap coverings to prove the following generalization of Lemma 4. We focus now on the case when ) is the unit cube, but the proof applies whenever a cap covering exists. . Analogously, we get a . (This is done by comparing the is a constant, and the computation is simpler. We now give a more direct proof of Lemma 3 for the case of the Normal distribution.
Lemma 5. Let¨B¨a
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Proof. We prove the lemma directly for the Normal density. We write 
A Las Vegas Algorithm
We now have the tools needed to analyse our very simple algorithm. Recall that the algorithm exhaustively checks for Nash equilibria with supports of size Thus, provided that our game has a Nash equilibrium induced by supports of constant size, we obtain a polynomial time algorithm. We will show that with high probability, a random game has a £ ¥ £ equilibrium. More generally, we consider the probability that there is no . To avoid confusion between row and column vectors, the sets . We remark that only the cardinalities of these intersections will be of consequence. Recall that The following claims will be useful in bounding these terms. 
is maximised when¨5¨a . The result then follows from Lemma 3.
Similarly, applying Lemma 4, or Lemma 5, we obtain . If a pair of strategies for Alice and a pair of strategies for Bob mutually induce facets with non-negative normals in the convex hull associated with the other pair then we have a Nash equilibrium. The normals to these facets also give the probability distributions on the strategy supports (at the Nash equilibrium). Thus our algorithm is entirely combinatorial.
Concluding Remarks
We have show that finding equilibria on average is easy. This raises several questions: (i) Can we extend the analysis to more general distributions? Our result is unaffected by linear transformations of the payoff matrices. So, for example, each matrix can be chosen from an arbitrary Gaussian.
(ii) Does our algorithm have polynomial expected running time? (iii) We crucially use the fact that the mean of each entry is zero. Is this necessary? An algorithm that works for Gaussian entries with arbitrary means (and time polynomial in the largest variance), akin to smoothed analysis [35] , would give a polynomial-time randomized algorithm for finding approximate Nash equilibria in arbitrary games [19] : add random Gaussians to the entries of the given payoff matrices; an equilibrium of the perturbed game will be an approximate equilibrium of the original game with high probability, given that the variance of the Gaussians is small enough. The current best algorithm for finding approximate equilibria has quasi-polynomial complexity [22] .
Finally, we observe that finding approximate equilibria in random games is quite easy: for both the distributions we consider, with high probability there will be many pure strategy approximate equilibria and hence one of them can be found in sublinear time.
